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We analyze the stability and dynamics of an overlapping generations model under imperfectly 
competitive labour markets without population growth and with perfect foresight. Under 
right-to-manage wage bargaining we assume that wage is negotiated after the decision on the 
capital stock. With Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions the steady state is unique 
and the steady state capital stock depends on the trade union’s bargaining power. This is 
because higher bargaining power of the trade union will induce workers to save more thus 
boosting the capital stock, ceteris paribus. Finally, we show that the steady state equilibrium 
is a saddle point. 
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1. Introduction 
It has been suggested that trade unions may affect the level of capital stock through 
their impact on wages and employment. Originally, Grout (1984) argued that in a 
situation where firms and trade unions bargain over both the wage and employment, 
the unions will have a negative effect on the level of investment in the absence of 
committed wage negotiation. Moreover, he argued that without binding contracts a 
higher bargaining power of the trade union will always lower the capital stock. van 
der Ploeg (1987) demonstrated the similar result in the right-to-manage case where 
the wage is subject to bargaining under the condition that labour demand is 
determined by firms. Anderson and Devereux (1988) suggested that the presence of 
monopoly trade union might lead to more serious adverse welfare effects than in the 
frameworks, which abstract from the strategic effect of the firm’s investment 
decision, i.e. when the firm can commit itself to a capital stock decision before 
wage determination. Anderson and Devereux (1991) used a monopoly trade union 
model to study the trade-off between the benefits of wage commitment and the costs 
of wage inflexibility in the design of the optimal contract length. They argue that 
there is a natural welfare trade-off between wage commitment and wage flexibility. 
Devereux and Lockwood (1991) used a simple overlapping generations (OG) 
model with capital (Diamond 1965) and unions to provide a counterexample to 
some findings of Grout (1984) and van der Ploeg (1987). They argued that a move 
from a committed to a flexible wage negotiation, i.e. when wages are negotiated not 
before but after the capital stock decision, may increase the capital stock as a result 
of the rise in the trade union’s bargaining power. This occurs in their model because 
higher bargaining power of trade union increases wage income and thus savings of 
the young generation. 
de la Croix and Licandro (1995) utilized a slightly different version of an OG 
model with capital and unions to investigate the effects of different types of 
irreversibilities on economic growth. Among other things they showed that a rise in 
trade union power may induce a crowding-out of physical capital by pure profits so 
that the effect on capital stock in their model is ambiguous. 
Dos Santos Ferreira and Lloyd-Braga (2002) and Bertocchi (2003) have 
recognized the importance of trade unions for economic growth. They have utilized   3
the overlapping generations model with trade  unions to study certain issues of 
economic growth. Dos Santos Ferreira and Lloyd-Braga have shown that 
endogenous growth is possible in a rather simple OG model with imperfect 
competition including wage bargaining. Bertocchi on the other hand has argued that 
e.g. the convergence of incomes between countries depends heavily on the structure 
of their labour markets. Both of these papers, however, and unlike we, utilize 
efficient wage bargaining.  
It is important to point out that in most of these papers the emphasis was not 
in the precise analysis of stability and dynamics.  We focus on these issues by 
extending the model of Devereux and Lockwood (1991). We use the right-to-
manage wage bargaining and derive labour demand given the negotiated wage and 
capital stock decided by firms. We modify a closed economy OG framework by 
incorporating imperfectly competitive labour markets via Nash wage bargaining. 
Under right-to manage wage bargaining, where employment is not negotiated but 
decided by firms, we assume that wage is negotiated given the capital stock. Wage 
bargaining takes place between the young workers and the old capitalists.  
We demonstrate the following results. With Cobb-Douglas utility and 
production functions the economy’s steady state is unique under imperfectly 
competitive labour market, and the steady state capital stock depends positively on 
the trade union’s bargaining power. This happens because higher bargaining power 
of the trade union will induce workers to save more, which boosts the capital stock. 
Finally, we study the dynamics of the model and show that the steady state 
equilibrium is a saddle point.  
We proceed as follows. In section 2 we present the basic framework and 
comparative statics of an overlapping generations model under Nash wage 
bargaining, where wages are negotiated after the capital stock has been decided by 
the representative firm. Section 3 analyses the steady state equilibrium and 
dynamics under flexible wage negotiation. Finally, there is a concluding section 
where we briefly summarize our new findings.   
 
2. An Overlapping Generations Model under Wage Bargaining  
We study an overlapping generations model without population growth (the 
amount of population is normalized to be unity) and with perfect foresight. The   4
young in each period are endowed with one unit of time, which they inelastically 
supply to the market. Their retirement consumption is provided by their savings, 
which can be invested in two assets. They supply capital to the firms, and also buy 
shares of those firms. There is an operative stock market here, because there will 
be profits due to the existence of trade unions and decreasing returns to scale. 
These are due either to technology, one fixed input or imperfectly competitive 
product markets. Later on we describe these three possibilities more precisely. 
We incorporate imperfect competition in labour markets into an overlapping 
generations model. The young workers form a labor union. They negotiate about 
the wage with the firm’s owners. There is right-to-manage (RTM), and thus 
employment is determined by firms (for alternative formulations of trade union 
models, see e.g. Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), chapter 7).  
As in Devereux and Lockwood (1991) we assume that the worker-consumers 
have the following Cobb-Douglas utility function 
(1) 








1 ) ( ) ( ) , (




,  refers to the consumption of the person born at the beginning of period t 
in the
th j  period of his life ( 2 , 1 = j ) if he is either employed ( E i = ) or 
unemployed ( U i = ). The young of each generation are endowed with a unit of 
labour which they supply inelastically. The periodic budget constraints of the 
employed person are  
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The unemployed person’s constraints are respectively  
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The young can save in two assets. 
i
t k 1 +  denotes the supply of capital and 
i
t 1 + θ  the 
number of shares bought by consumer  of type i.   t q  is the price of a share in 
period  t, and  1 + t d  denotes the dividend per share paid in period  1 + t .  t w  is the 
wage rate and  t b  is the exogenously given unemployment insurance compensation. 
1 + t R  is the interest factor (and the gross return on capital) between periods t and 
t+1. Because there is no uncertainty, there is an obvious arbitrage condition here,   5
which says that the return on investing in capital should be equal to investing in the 
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t I  denotes the income of the type i worker-
consumer.  
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t I s ) 1 ( λ − = , where λ is constant. This means that total 
savings do not depend on the interest factor, because with Cobb-Douglas utility 
function the substitution and income effect cancel each other out. We can thus 
write the indirect utility functions of both types as 
(4i)   w R w R R w V
E λ λ λ λ λ λ λ
− − − = − =
1 1 1 ˆ ) 1 ( ) , (  
(4ii)  b R b R R w V
U λ λ λ λ λ λ λ
− − − = − =
1 1 1 ˆ ) 1 ( ) , ( ,  
where   . ) 1 ( ˆ 1 λ λ λ λ λ
− − =  Thus the utility depends positively both on wage income 
and the rate of return on savings. 
The firms are assumed to have the following production  function: 
()
µ α α µ − =
1 ) , ( n K L K F , with  1 0 < <α  and  1 0 < < µ . The restriction on the 
parameter µ  can be given three different justifications.   
We can assume that (i) the production function has decreasing returns-to-
scale so that  . 1 < µ  In this case we also have decreasing returns to scale in terms of 
capital and labour. (ii) Our decreasing returns to scale specification can be justified 
also in a realistic way by assuming that (a) the production technology has a 
property of constant returns to scale in terms of capital and labour so that 
1 = + β α , but (b) product markets are imperfectly competitive. Assuming e.g. an 
iso-elastic demand function 
ε − = p p D ) (  (p  is the product price) , we can write 
the firm’s gross revenue function as 
) / 1 ( 1 ε − = F pF , where the price elasticity of 
product demand is higher than one, but less than infinity i.e.  1 ) / 1 ( 1 < − = ε µ . This 
monopolistic competition assumption (see e.g. Dixit and Stiglitz 1977) also 
provides a justification for our decreasing returns to scale assumption in production 
technology. (iii) Finally, this can also be justified by assuming that there is a three 
factor technology with constant returns to scale, i.e. 
) ( 1 ) , , (
β α β α + − = M n K M n K F , 
when input M  is fixed.    6
The firms rent capital from consumers and hire labour. Their profit will be 
(5)    t t t t t t t K r n w L K F − − = Π
µ ) , (.  
We will consider the case of what Devereux and Lockwood (1991) call a 
non-binding solution. This means that firms have committed to a level of capital 
stock before they negotiate about the wage (see also de la Croix and Licandro 
(1995)). In a recent study Hellwig (2004) has compared a number of key properties 
associated with two alternative timing structures between negotiated wage setting 
and investment decisions within the framework of an intertemporal general 
equilibrium model. He suggests that although the long-term labour demand with 
endogenous investment is more elastic than the short-term demand, it does not 
necessarily lead to a less aggressive wage policy. The wage-employment trade-off 
in his model depends on whether the elasticity of substitution in production is 
lower than or higher than the inverse of the elasticity of marginal utility in 
consumption. Our present analysis does not address these hold-up problems. They 
might be particularly important, if firms can adjust their investment decisions in 
the short run.  
The first-order condition for employment is (dropping the time subscripts for 
convenience) with a given level of capital stock 
(6)  w n K = −
− − 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 (
µ α αµ µ α . 
Solving the labor demand we get 
(7)   [ ]
η αµη η η αµη η η η η µ α
− − − = − = w K w K n ) / ) 1 (( ) 1 ( , 
where [] ) 1 ( 1 / 1 / α µ η − − = − = n w nw , which is greater than unity because 
1 , 0 < < α µ . We denote by  1 / ) 1 ( < = − B η η . Labour demand depends negatively 
on wage and positively on capital stock, since capital and labour are complements in 
production, i.e.  0 > nK F . 
The representative firm and the trade union negotiate about the wage given 
that the firms are on their labour demand curve. Instead of efficient bargaining we 
use the RTM approach. The negotiated wage rate can then be solved from the 
following Nash bargaining problem 
 
(PN)  { () ( )
β β −
Π − Π − = Ω
1




  s.t.  
η αµη η − = w K B n ,   7
where  t U  ( t U )  denotes the utility (fallback utility) of the trade union,  t Π  is the 
fallback profit of the firm and β  denotes the relative bargaining power of trade 
union.





t t t V n V n U ) 1 ( − + = . Since an unemployed person gets an unemployment 
insurance compensation we assume that 
U
t t V U = . Given the fact that firms have 
committed to the level of capital stock before wage negotiations, they have to pay 
the rentals even in the case of no agreement. This means that  t t t K r − = Π .  
Incorporating the fallback utility and profit into (PN) we can now rewrite the 
RTM Nash bargaining problem as 
 




+ − − = Ω
1
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t w
n w n K F n b w R Max  
                                s.t.  
η αµη η − = w K B n . 
 
The first-order condition reduces to 
(8)   []
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The negotiated wage depends positively on the level of unemployment insurance 
compensation and trade union’s relative bargaining power, while negatively on the 
wage elasticity of labour demand, which becomes higher with more intensified 
product market competition. It is important to keep in mind that in the case of 
Cobb-Douglas production function the negotiated wage does not depend on the 
level of capital stock, since the wage elasticity of labour demand is constant, i.e. it 




1− =  and α . 
                                                           
1   The Nash maximand (PN’ below), i.e. the weighted product of the net gains of the bargainers,  
can be justified both via the axiomatic approach by Nash (1950) and via the strategic approach 
by Rubinstein  (1982). These approaches are of course very different, but interestingly, Nash’s 
axiomatic solution can also be obtained as a limit solution to a non-cooperative game in which 
the time interval between alternative offers approaches zero (see Binmore et. al, 1986 for a proof 
of this assertion).       8
The negotiated wage means that the share of output going to the employed 
workers (i.e.  t
N
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In what follows we denote the mark-up between the negotiated wage and 
unemployment insurance compensation by  A ≡ − − + ) 1 /( ) 1 ( η η β . Thus we can 
rewrite equation (11) as follows  
(12)   [ ] B b A K B n w n K F
N − = −
− − − 1 ) , (
1 1 1 η η αµη η µ . 
We can now write dividends ( ) rK wn F Div − − =
µ  as 
(13)  [ ] rK B b A K B Div − − =
− − − 1
1 1 1 η η αµη η . 
  We first note that  1 )) 1 ( 1 /( < − − = α µ αµ αµη , and 
[] 0 1
1 1 1 > ≡ −
− − − H B b A B
η η η . The partial derivatives of H  are:  0 < A H  and  0 < b H . 
We  also note that [ ] 1 ) 1 (
1 1 − − ≡
− − B b A HB η
η η   so that 0 = B H , since  1 ) 1 ( = − B η .  
The signs of derivatives are intuitive. A higher mark-up and higher unemployment 
insurance compensation will increase the wage demands, and thus have a negative 
effect on dividends.  
We note that dividend is a strictly concave function of the capital stock, and 











∞ → lim . There is then an interior 
maximizing solution given that 0 > H . The first-order condition for a maximum 
capital stock will then be 
(15)  r H K =
−1 αµη αµη , 
where we can solve for the optimal capital stock and also use it to compute the 
dividend as a function of the capital stock as   9
(16)  η µ
α µ
µ αµη α µ
αµ
) 1 (
) 1 ( 1









− − H K H K Div . 
In the next section we explore stability and dynamics under flexible RTM 
wage negotiations.  
 
3.   Steady States and Dynamical Equilibria under Flexible Wage 
Negotiation  
We can now characterize the equilibrium of this economy. Saving must be 
allocated to the capital stock and the shares of the firm. The second equilibrium 
condition is the arbitrage condition for the returns from investing in the capital 
stock and the shares. The total capital stock ( 1 + t K ) must be equal to the amount 




t t k n k n 1 1 ) 1 ( + + − + ). 
We normalize the aggregate number of shares to be unity, i.e. 




t t n n θ θ . Given this normalization and the utility function (i.e. the 
saving behavior) we get the following capital market equilibrium condition  
(17)  [] t t t t t t q b b w n K − + − − = + ) ( ) 1 ( 1 λ . 
The arbitrage condition, 
(18)  1 1 1 ) 1 ( + + + − + = t t t t d q r q , 
is the other equilibrium condition. 
Given the negotiated wage (9), the first order condition for a maximum 
capital stock (15) and the dividend as a function of the capital stock (16) we get the 
following dynamical system for the capital stock and the share price  
(19)  [ ] t t t q b A b B Ab K K − + − − =
−
+ ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1
η η αµη λ  
(20)    [] η µ αµη
αµη αµη ) 1 ( 1 1
1
1 1 − − + = +
−
+ + H K q H K q t t t t . 
  In the steady state ( 0 = ∆ t K  and  0 = ∆ t q ) we have 
(21)  [ ] K A b B Ab K b q − − − + − =
− ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
η η αµη λ λ ) (K G ≡  
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1 . 
    The first equation describing the capital market equilibrium condition in 
steady state is nonlinear, while the second one, describing the arbitrage condition, 
is linear. We note from (21) that  0 ) 1 ( ) 0 ( > − = b G λ  and   10
() 1 ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( '
1 − − − =
− − αµη η η αµη λ K A b B Ab K G . We can see that  ∞ =
→ ) ( ' lim
0 K G
K  
and  1 ) ( ' lim − =
∞ → K G
K . One can see that the slope of (22) decreases, when the 
elasticity of output with respect to capital stock ( µ α ) increases. These properties 
imply that we can draw the following diagram, which shows that the steady state 
( * K ) is unique. 
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We collect the previous findings in the following Proposition.   
Proposition 1: With Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions the steady  
  state of the OG economy described by equations (21) and (22) is 
unique, when wages are decided by the RTM bargaining before the 
capital stock.  
   What happens to the steady state capital stock, when trade  union’s 
bargaining power is higher? Bargaining power affects only the first steady state 
equation (21). We present the result in the next Proposition.    
 
 
Proposition 2: With Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions, and with RTM 
bargaining before the capital stock decision the steady state capital 
stock is higher the bigger is the trade union’s bargaining power.    11
Proof:  The bargaining power, β , affects the curve (21) through the term 
) 1 /( ) 1 ( − − + = η η β A . The total effect can be obtained by considering the effect of 
β on  
η η − − − A A
1  (see equation (21)). Differentiating we get 
()
1 1 ) 1 (






A A A A . This is positive, since  0 ) 1 /( 1 > − = η β A . This 
means that the curve (21) shifts up, when the bargaining power is increased, and 
thus the steady state capital stock increases. Q.E.D. 
    Proposition 2 follows from the fact that the improved bargaining power 
will induce workers to save more, ceteris paribus, which in turn boosts the capital 
stock. 
    Next we study the dynamics of the model by considering paths for which 
t t K K ≥ +1  and  t t q q ≥ +1 . It follows from (19) that 
(23)  [ ] t t t t t K q b A b B Ab K K K ≥ − + − − ⇔ ≥
−
+ ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1
η η αµη λ . 
   ⇒ [ ] ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( t t t t K M K b A b B Ab K q ≡ − + − − ≤
− η η αµη λ . 
  We note that capital stock is growing below the curve  ) ( t t K M q = . 
    It follows from (20) for the dynamics of the arbitrage equation that 
 (24)         [] t t t t t t q H K q H K q q ≥ − − + ⇔ ≥ +
−
+ + η µ αµη
αµη αµη ) 1 ( 1 1
1
1 1  























,   
because  . 1 ) 1 ( = + − αµ µ η   We have thus  obtained that  t t q q ≥ +1  implies that 
1 ) / ) 1 (( + − ≥ t t K q αµ µ . To go on to analyse the paths, where t t q q ≥ +1 , we substitute 
the expression for  1 + t K  from equation (19) and obtain 
 (25)    [] {} t t t q b A b B Ab K q − + − −
−
≥
− ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 (




  which can be rewritten as 
(26)   [ ] ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( t t t K Q b A b B Ab K q ≡ + − − ≥
− η η αµη λ αµη .  
The share price is increasing above the curve ) ( t t K Q q = . By differentiating (23) 
and (26) with respect to K  we obtain 
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(28)        
1 2 ) 1 ( ) )( 1 ( ) ( ) ( '
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αµη η η λ αµη K A b B Ab K Q     12
 
Furthermore, we note that  b Q b M ) 1 ( ) 0 ( ) 1 ( ) 0 ( λ αµη λ − = > − = ,    ∞ =
→ ) ( ' lim
0 K M
K  
and  ∞ =
→ ) ( ' lim
0 K Q
K . In addition we have that  1 ) ( ' lim − =
∞ → K M
K  and  0 ) ( ' lim =
∞ → K Q
K . 
We have already proved that the steady state is unique. Thus we can depict the 
qualitative features of our model in Figure 2. The Figure indicates that the steady 
state is a saddle. 





t t K K = +1
t t q q = +1
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) ( t t K M q =
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To study formally the stability properties of dynamical equilibrium, we 
rewrite equation (19) as follows 
(29)   [ ] ) , ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1 t t t t t q K Z q b A b B Ab K K ≡ − + − − =
−
+
η η αµη λ  
  Substituting the RHS of (29) for  1 + t K  in (20) gives an implicit equation for  1 + t q , 
 (30)  ) , ( 1 t t t q K P q = +  
  The planar system describing the dynamics of the capital stock and the share price 
consists now of equations (29) and (30). The Jacobian matrix of the partial 
derivatives of the system (29)-(30) can be written as 












  where            
   [ ] ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 (
1 − − =
− − A b B Ab K ZK
η η αµη αµη λ  














αµη αµη  
  0 ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( ) (
) 1 ( 2 2 < − − − − =
− − αµη η η αµ λ µ η HK A b B Ab P K   (See Appendix 1 for 
details). 
      We prove the following  
Proposition3: The steady state equilibrium is a saddle point. 
Proof. See Appendix 2. 
 
4. Conclusions 
We have explored the stability and dynamics in an overlapping generations 
economy with wage bargaining. Under right-to manage bargaining, where 
employment is not negotiated but decided by firms, we have assumed that wage is 
negotiated given the capital stock and that wage bargaining process takes place 
between the young workers and the old capitalists. We have provided the following 
results.  
With Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions the economy’s steady 
state is unique and the steady state capital stock depends positively on the trade 
union’s bargaining power. This is because the higher bargaining power of the trade 
union will induce workers to save more, which boosts the capital stock. Finally, we 
study the dynamics of the model and show that in this OLG framework under 
imperfectly competitive labour markets the steady state equilibrium is a saddle 
point.  
An interesting further research topic would be to analyse these issues in the 
open economy framework (for one such an OG specification, see Bertocchi 2003) 
and in the presence of outsourcing of economic activities under imperfectly 
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Appendix 1: Derivation of the partials of the Jacobian matrix. 
We rewrite equation (20) as follows  
(A1)  H K Hq K q q t t t t t
αµη αµη η µ αµη 1
1
1 1 ) 1 ( +
−
+ + − − + = . 














αµη αµη , 
since from the analysis in the text we know that 1 / 1 − = ∂ ∂ + t t q K . Computing from 
(A1) we get 
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+
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∂
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1 < − −
− H K
αµη η µ  
This means that 
(A4)  H K P q
1 1
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1  (= K P ). We have 
1 1/ + + ∂ ∂ t t K q  from (A3), and get from (29) 
(A5)  
1 1 ) 1 ( ) )( )( 1 (
− − + − − =
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t .  
Thus we get 
(A6)         0 ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( ) (
) 1 ( 2 2 < − − − − =
− − αµη η η αµ λ µ η HK A b B Ab P K . 
We can also express this as 
1 ) 1 (
− − − =
αµη η µ HK Z P K K . 
 
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 3. 
 
  We analyze the stability of the system (19) and (20), which characterizes the 
dynamics of the capital stock and the share price. The characteristic polynomial 
associated with the system (28) and (29) expressed in terms of D and T is 
 (A7)  0 ) (
2 = + − = D T p λ λ λ  
  It is known from the stability theory of difference equations (see e.g. Azariadis, 
1993, pp. 63-67, and de la Croix and Michel, 2002, pp. 321-322) that for a saddle 
point to exist the roots of  0 ) ( = λ p  need to be on both sides of (minus and plus) 
unity. Thus for a saddle we need that D-T+1 < 0 and D+T+1 > 0 or D-T+1 > 0 and 
D+T+1 < 0. 
      The planar system describing the dynamics of the capital stock and the 
share price consists now of equations (29) and (30). The Jacobian matrix of the 
partial derivatives of the system can be written as 
 












  where 
           
   [ ] 0 ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 (
1 > − − =
− − A b B Ab K ZK
η η αµη αµη λ  
   1 − = q Z    15
  
1 − − =
αµη ηHK Z P K K  





  Computing the trace ( q K P Z T + = ) and determinant ( K q K P P Z D + = ) we obtain 
(A9)   [ ] 1 1 ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 (
1 1 > + + − − =
− − − H K A b B Ab K T
αµη η η αµη αµη λ  
(A10)  [ ]= − − + = − − =
− − − H K H K Z HK Z P Z D K K q K
1 1 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 (
αµη αµη αµη µ η η µ
  [ ] [ ] 0 ) ( 1 ) 1 ( 1 ( 1
1 1 > + = − − +
− − αµη µ η
αµη αµη H K Z H K Z K K . 
  Now we conclude that 0 1> + +T D . Next we compute  1 + −T D  to get  
(A11)  [ ] K Z H K T D αµη
αµη − − = + −
− 1 1
1 . 
Rewriting we get 
(A12)    [ ] ) 1 ( ) ( ) )( 1 ( 1 1
1 2 1 − − − − = + −
− − − A b B Ab K H K T D
η η αµη αµη αµη λ . 
     We next develop the term  ) 1 ( ) ( ) )( 1 (
1 2 − −
− − A b B Ab K
η η αµη αµη λ   from 
(A12), and denote it by Y . Using the steady state relations (21) and (22) we can 
express Y  as follows 





A b B Ab K
Y
) 1 ( ) ( ) )( 1 (
) (
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) 1 ( 1 ) (
) 1 ( ) (
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  Since the original term is positive, and the fact that 1 < αµη , this must be less than 
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